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Article 
Decentralized and Anomalous 
Interpretation of Chinese Private Law: 
Understanding a Bureaucratic and 
Political Judicial System 
Yun-chien Chang† & Ke Xu†† 
INTRODUCTION 
China’s dazzling economic development in the past few dec-
ades has increased the welfare of the Chinese people but caused 
headaches for legal and economic-development scholars. A 
widely shared view has been that delineation of rights is a pre-
requisite to market exchange and economic development. 1 
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Ran You, and Lei Zhao for their helpful comments. Songtao Liu, the Director of 
ClassicLaw, kindly provided us with the needed data. 
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 1. For scholarship that emphasizes the importance of delineating rights, 
see generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000) 
(emphasizing the role of formal property rights in the transformation of dead 
capital into live capital); R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 
1, 16 (1960) (arguing that “the initial delimitation of legal rights does have an 
effect on the efficiency with which the economic system operates”). 
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China, however, has developed mostly without clear entitlement 
delineation.2 This phenomenon is called the China Puzzle, as it 
is contrary to the norm.3 The prevailing explanation of China’s 
success is that de facto fiscal federalism,4 fostering jurisdictional 
competition at the xian level,5 when combined with a unitary bu-
reaucrat promotion system, 6  provides local bureaucrats with 
strong incentives to perform.7 That is, public-law institutions ac-
count for China’s growth, while the usefulness of private-law in-
stitutions is questioned. 
Nonetheless, if China continues to grow, law and develop-
ment scholars may have to ask a new question: should delinea-
tion of rights get credit now? In the first decade of this millen-
nium, the National People’s Congress of China enacted the 
Property Act of 2007,8 the Labor Contract Act of 2007,9 and the 
 
 2. For a case study on Shenzhen, China that demonstrates economic de-
velopment without clear, formal legal titles, see, for example, Shitong Qiao, 
Planting Houses in Shenzhen: A Real Estate Market Without Legal Titles, 29 
CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 253 (2014). 
 3. See, e.g., Wei Shen & Wen-yeu Wang, Conclusion: A Tale of Two 
Jurisdictions—Is It an End to the Divergence of Private Law?, in PRIVATE LAW 
IN CHINA AND TAIWAN: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES 304, 325 (Yun-chien 
Chang et al. eds., 2016); Frank K. Upham, What Are Property Rights Good For? 
Surprising Lessons from the Chinese Experience, in RETHINKING LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT: THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE 82, 85 (Guanghua Yu ed. 2013); 
Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China 
Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 89–93 (2003); Frank K. Upham, Speculations 
on Legal Informality: On Winn’s “Relational Practices and the Marginalization 
of Law,” 28 L. & SOC’Y REV. 233, 233–37 (1994). 
 4. See, e.g., Hehui Jin et al., Regional Decentralization and Fiscal 
Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1719, 1721 (2005); 
Gabriella Montinola et al., Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for 
Economic Success in China, 48 WORLD POL. 50, 63–65 (1995). 
 5. See generally Steven N.S. Cheung, The Economic System of 
China, 1 MAN & ECON. 1, 19 (2014) (stating that competition at the xian level 
is the “most intense” because economic power rests primarily at this level). 
 6. See Zhou Li-An (周黎安), Zhongguo Difang Guangyuan de Jinsheng 
Jinbiaosai Moshi Yanjiu, (中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究) [Governing 
China’s Local Officials: An Analysis of Promotion Tournament Model], 7 JINGJI 
YANJIU (经济研究) [ECON. RES. J.] 36, 38 (2007). 
 7. See Roderick M. Hills Jr. & Shitong Qiao, Voice and Exit as 
Accountability Mechanisms: Can Foot-Voting Be Made Safe for the Chinese 
Communist Party?, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158, 177–79 (2017). 
 8. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wuquan Fa (中华人民共和国物权法) 
[Property Rights Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007) 
[hereinafter Property Rights Law], http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-03/19/content_ 
554452.htm (China). 
 9. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa (中华人民共和国劳
动合同法) [Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 
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Tort Liability Act of 2009.10 The Contract Act was passed in 
1999.11 A political decision made in the Fourth Plenary Session 
of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) has rekindled the effort to integrate these statutes into 
one civil code, and the General Principle part of the proposed 
Chinese Civil Code was passed in March 2017.12 This means 
that at least the law on the books and, arguably, legal rights as 
well, have been delineated more clearly. Even when the statutes 
have fuzzy edges—such as whether “small property” (that is, il-
legal buildings) will be torn down13—the focal points derived 
from social norms and social understanding assure property 
holders that their rights will be protected.14 Before declaring a 
belated victory for the delineation-of-rights thesis, we need to 
pause and remind ourselves of the old wisdom: the law on the 
books is not the law in action. More specifically, we should ask 
ourselves if a particular doctrine contained in a private-law stat-
 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) 
[hereinafter Labor Law], http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2013-04/15/ 
content_1811058.htm (China). 
 10. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qinquan Zeren Fa (中华人民共和国侵权
责任法) [Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Stand-
ing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010), http:// 
www.gov.cn/flfg/2009-12/26/content_1497435.htm (China). 
 11. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetong Fa (中华人民共和国合同法) [Con-
tract Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), http://www 
.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/06/content_4732.htm (China). 
 12. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Zongze (中华人民共和国民法总则) 
[General Provisions of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China] (prom-
ulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2017, effective 
Oct. 1, 2017) [hereinafter General Civil Law Provisions], http://www.npc 
.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2017-03/15/content_2018907.htm (China). 
 13. According to the Ministry of Land and Resources, the government may 
not issue ownership certificates to buyers of small properties, which creates un-
certainty regarding how the government should deal with them. Guotu Ziyu-
anbu, Zhongyang Nongcun Gongzuo Lingdongxiaozu, Caizhengbu, Nongyebu 
Guanyu Nongcun Jiti Tudi Quequan Fazheng de Ruogan Yijian (国土资源部、
中央农村工作领导小组办公室、财政部、农业部关于农村集体土地确权登记发证的
若干意见) [Several Opinions of the Ministry of Land and Resources, Central 
Leading Group Office for Rural Work, by the Ministry of Finance, and the Min-
istry of Agriculture on Registration and Certification To Verify Collectively-
Owned Rural Land], MINISTRY LAND & RESOURCES CHINA (中华人民共和国国土
资源部) (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.mlr.gov.cn/zwgk/zytz/201111/t20111110_ 
1024313.htm (China). 
 14. See, e.g., Shitong Qiao, Small Property, Big Market: A Focal Point 
Explanation, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 197, 223–24 (2015); Shitong Qiao & Frank 
Upham, The Evolution of Relational Property Rights: A Case of Chinese Rural 
Land Reform, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2479, 2500–01 (2015). 
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ute will be interpreted in drastically different ways, will the con-
tour of rights be clear enough to sustain economic develop-
ment?15 
There are three major scenarios in a large country with a 
unitary legal system: centralized interpretations, decentralized 
interpretations, and anomalous interpretations. A casual ob-
server of the Chinese legal system may expect to find centralized 
interpretation of national statutes, as one would expect in an au-
thoritarian regime with strong, centralized power. One-size-fits-
all statutes and interpretations can contribute to economic de-
velopment if the statutes are sensible enough and the transac-
tion costs of working around the statutes are not prohibitive.16 
Scholars who believe that local knowledge is more useful in 
dealing with local problems may expect to observe plenty of de-
centralized interpretations. China is the largest nonfederalist 
country in the world.17 Social norms, natural environments, and 
economic development levels, among other factors, are very dif-
ferent across its provinces.18 There is likely to be pressure to de-
viate from plain or obscure meanings of national statutes that 
do not meet local needs.19 Decentralized interpretations of pri-
vate laws could increase or decrease economic efficiency, thus 
adding fuel to, or putting a stop to, economic development.20 If, 
 
 15. During the Hong Kong symposium, Richard Epstein questioned our ap-
proach of using court cases to examine whether rights are clearly delineated, as 
court cases are not representative of all disputes. He further questioned 
whether it is more important, in terms of the delineation of rights, to assess 
whether many ordinary private arrangements have been interrupted. We rec-
ognize that the latter question is very important, but it is outside the scope of 
this Article. We contend that if court cases are known to be subject to political 
influence and people bargain under the shadow of court decisions, ordinary pri-
vate arrangements will be affected, too. 
 16. See John Linarelli, The Economics of Uniform Laws and Uniform Law-
making, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 1387, 1395–97 (2003). 
 17. See Thomas B. Foley, A Devolution Revolution? Disputing De Facto 
Federalism in China, 37 H.K. L.J. 951, 980–90 (2007) (listing the characteristics 
of federalism that China lacks, such as independent leaders and tax spending 
and automony). 
 18. See Tan Qixiang (谭其骧), Zhongguo Wenhua de Shidaicahayi he Diqu 
Chayi (中国文化的时代差异和地区差异) [The Difference of Times and Areas in 
Chinese Culture], 2 FUDAN XUEBAO (复旦学报) [FUDAN U.] 5–12 (1986). 
 19. See Foley, supra note 17, at 975 (explaining that homogeneity across 
Chinese provinces is “inefficient . . . because China’s vast size and diverse geog-
raphy means needs and resources are different across the country”). 
 20. Compare id., with Shitong Qiao, Rights-Weakening Federalism, 
102 MINN. L. REV. 1673, 1676 (2018) (arguing that the central government in 
China protects property rights more than do local governments). 
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for example, the standard of care in tort law, the notice require-
ment in property law, and the statute of frauds in contract law 
are sufficiently different across provinces without much rational 
basis, heightened information costs may slow economic growth. 
By contrast, if local customs with low information costs are le-
gally recognized, total social welfare in China is likely to in-
crease.21  
The worst case scenario is anomalous interpretations. 
Whereas decentralized interpretations largely follow geographic 
boundaries due to non-legal-institutional constraints and the ju-
risdictional boundaries of the thirty-one provincial high courts, 
anomalous interpretations are unconventional statutory inter-
pretations that are without pattern. While there must be (unob-
servable) reasons for courts to render them, they are highly 
likely to harm economic development, as they create unpredict-
ability that economic actors cannot plan around. 
In this Article, we develop a positive theory of the decentral-
ized and anomalous interpretations of Chinese private law. At 
the core of our theory is the observation that Chinese courts are 
both political and bureaucratic.22 This dual nature makes them 
unique. Very few courts in the world are both political and bu-
reaucratic. For instance, federal appellate courts in the United 
States, including the Supreme Court, are often political but not 
bureaucratic,23 whereas Japanese courts are bureaucratic but 
not political.24 Because of the political and bureaucratic court 
system in China, examples and instances of decentralized and 
anomalous interpretations are far more numerous than casual 
observers would expect. That is, decentralized and anomalous 
 
 21. For discussions of property customs and information costs, see Yun-
chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, The Numerus Clausus Principle, Property 
Customs, and the Emergence of New Property Forms, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2275 
(2015); Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 5 (2009). 
 22. See, e.g., SUGIAN GUO, CHINESE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: POWER, 
IDEOLOGY, AND ORGANIZATION 188 (2013) (observing that Chinese judges are 
appointed based on a political and ideological standard and are subject to a bu-
reaucratic hierarchy). 
 23. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RA-
TIONAL CHOICE 101 (2013) (observing that “[t]he Supreme Court is widely re-
garded, and not only by political scientists, as a political court”). 
 24. See, e.g., J. MARK RAMSEYER, SECOND-BEST JUSTICE: THE VIRTUES OF 
JAPANESE PRIVATE LAW 206–38 (2015); Shozo Ota, Reform of Civil Procedure in 
Japan, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 561, 574 (2001). 
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interpretations in China have the same root: the sociopolitical 
pressure on courts, often from the political branch. 
Courts have long been considered a part of the political 
branch by the CCP.25 While in recent years, judges have become 
more professional,26 court presidents are still political appoin-
tees and often staffed by former agency heads or party cadres.27 
Court presidents embrace local needs and political concerns, and 
prioritize them over interpreting statutes to be consistent with 
other courts or to best fit statutory text.28 Judges nested in a 
highly bureaucratic system often succumb to the political needs 
internalized in courts via court presidents.29 The result is that 
private-law statutes are sometimes bent to fit local needs. 
Should these needs be province-wide, even just in the short term, 
decentralized interpretations would be observed in opinions and 
other documents issued by the provincial high courts. If the po-
litical pressure is small in scale, idiosyncratic interpretations 
would only appear in isolated cases spread across the country. 
One might challenge our thesis, countering that deviations 
from standard statutory interpretations will be suppressed and 
corrected through the unified judicial system; that is, by the Su-
preme People’s Court (SPC).30 But this is not the case in China. 
Provincial courts avoid the reversal of nonmainstream interpre-
tations by the unified judicial system for two major reasons.31 
 
 25. See Zhu Suli, Political Parties in China’s Judiciary, 17 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 533, 539–43 (2007). 
 26. See Zuo Weimin (左卫民), Zhongguo Faguan Renyong Jizhi: Jiyu Linian 
de Chubu Pingxi (中国法官任用机制：基于理念的初步评析) [Judges’ Appoint-
ment in China: A Conceptual Comment and Analysis], 5 XIANDAI FAXUE (现代
法学) [MOD. L. SCI.] 43, 43–45 (2010). 
 27. For instance, one-third of the presidents of the thirty-one provincial 
high courts were promoted from outside the court system in 2008. See Liu Zhong 
(刘忠), Zhengzhixing yu Sifa Jishu Zhijian: Fayuan Yuanzhang XuanRen de 
Fuhe Eryuan Jiegou (政治性与司法技术之间：法院院长选任的复合二元结构) [Be-
tween Political Demands and Judicial Skills: Compounded Double Structure of 
Appointing Presidents of Courts], 5 FALYU KEXUE (法律科学) [SCI. L.] 17, 17–29 
(2015). 
 28. See, for example, the bold claim made by Ying Yong. See infra text ac-
companying note 61 (quoting the former President of the Shanghai High Court). 
 29. GUO, supra note 22, at 169–72 (describing the Chinese legal system as 
an “integral part of the executive branch”). 
 30. See Case Law Chinese Style—Where Is It Going?, SUPREME PEOPLE’S 
CT. MONITOR (Jan. 18, 2015), https://supremepeoplescourtmonitor.com/2015/01/ 
18/case-law-chinese-style-where-is-it-going (discussing the “guiding cases” that 
the court president established to “unify[ ] the application of the law”). 
 31. Provincial courts also window-dress their opinions. See ZHENG 
YONGNIAN, DE FACTO FEDERALISM IN CHINA: REFORMS AND DYNAMICS OF 
CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS 12 (2007) (“A province might claim to be adapting 
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First, there are four levels of courts in China,32 but a case 
becomes final in only two instances.33 Low- or medium- stakes 
cases must first be filed with the provincial district courts or pro-
vincial intermediate courts and, pursuant to jurisdictional rules, 
will never go to the SPC.34 Accordingly, most contract, property, 
and tort cases remain in the provincial courts. Essentially, pri-
vate law is the domain of the provinces, just like state courts in 
the United States primarily handle state law cases. Additionally, 
in contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court, which prioritizes grant-
ing certiorari to cases that contain issues that have split the 
courts of appeals,35 the SPC is inclined to avoid taking a position 
on contentious issues of statutory interpretation in the area of 
private law.36 This leaves more room for provincial courts to 
work out differing solutions to the same legal issue. 
To support our bold claim, we offer one of the very first large-
scale empirical studies of Chinese court decisions to test our the-
ory. Aided by powerful textual analysis of hundreds of millions 
of cases in China, we gleaned thousands of relevant cases to con-
duct further analysis. Our goal was to identify statutory inter-
pretations of the Property Act of 2007 that are clearly wrong 
from a doctrinal perspective. In identifying errors, we only in-
cluded those errors that were so obvious and fundamental that 
judicial incompetence was unlikely to be the sole reason for the 
decision. More specifically, this Article analyzes two issues. The 
first is the judicial recognition of dian right, an idiosyncratic, 
 
a central policy to local conditions when, in fact, its provincial implementation 
is intended to achieve some other goals.”). 
 32. The four levels are the provincial district courts, provincial intermedi-
ate courts, provincial high courts, and Supreme People’s Court (SPC). 
 33. See infra Part I.B. 
 34. See infra Table 1. Only disputes with extremely high stakes can go to 
the SPC. For jurisdictional rules, see Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu 
Tiaozheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan he Zhongji Renmin Fayuan Guanxia Diyishen 
Minshangshi Anjian Biaozhun de Tongzhi (最高人民法院关于调整高级人民法院
和中级人民法院管辖第一审民商事案件标准的通知) [Notice of the Supreme Peo-
ple’s Court on Adjusting the Standards for the Jurisdiction of the Higher Peo-
ple’s Courts and Intermediate People’s Courts over Civil and Commercial Cases 
of the First Instance] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Apr. 30, 2015, ef-
fective May 1, 2015) [hereinafter Notice of Jurisdiction Standards Adjustment], 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=967b38788f4b2931bdfb&lib=law# (China). 
 35. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 246 (1991); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & 
Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations 
in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 407 (2004). 
 36. See infra Part II.C. 
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mortgage-like Chinese property form not recognized by the Prop-
erty Act of 2007 as a type of property right.37 Second, we inves-
tigate whether courts have followed an explicit stipulation in the 
Property Act of 2007 to apply this Act instead of the previous 
Security Property Right Act of 1995. In both cases, we find un-
conventional statutory interpretations. As the judges who ren-
dered these decisions often cited other provisions of the Property 
Act of 2007, it is unlikely that they were not aware of the provi-
sions they violated. Since we did not find patterns in these deci-
sions, it seems that delineation of rights is not entirely clear. 
This Article is structured as follows: Part I elaborates on the 
unique institutional environment in China that has led to the 
decentralized development of private law in a unified system. We 
tell the story of the idiosyncratic features of Chinese courts, 
which lead to the political and bureaucratic nature of the courts 
in China. Part II summarizes the data and methodology of our 
empirical studies in property law and reports our findings. In 
addition, we draw on existing work that shows that provincial 
courts have taken different positions on contract law, tort law, 
and employment law from those taken by the SPC and other pro-
vincial courts. Statutes are often interpreted differently across 
provinces in China. 
I.  POLITICS-DRIVEN INTERPRETATION OF PRIVATE 
LAW   
This Part elaborates on our theory that decentralized and 
anomalous interpretations of private law in China are attribut-
able to the influence of local politics. China does not have a West-
ern separation-of-powers governmental structure. Instead, the 
Chinese system exhibits a division of labor between the courts 
and the administrative branch. While judges and low-ranking 
government employees do not change positions on a regular ba-
sis, agency heads and court presidents are comparable bureau-
cratic positions. Court presidents must be politically connected 
to maintain the normal function of their courts, causing political 
 
 37. For an analysis of the dian right, see Taisu Zhang, Property Rights in 
Land, Agricultural Capitalism, and the Relative Decline of Pre-Industrial 
China, 13 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 129, 138 (2011); see generally YUN-CHIEN CHANG 
ET AL., PROPERTY AND TRUST LAW IN TAIWAN 55–56 (2017); Robert C. Ellickson, 
The Costs of Complex Land Titles: Two Examples from China, 1 BRIGHAM-
KANNER PROP. RIGHTS CONF. J. 281 (2012). 
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pressure to routinely enter the courts.38 Statutes are thus inter-
preted in a nonstandard fashion, or simply ignored, in order to 
cater to local interests. If most cases could be appealed to the 
provincial high courts or even the SPC, these higher courts, 
which are relatively insulated from local politics, could correct 
wrongful statutory interpretations and unify the application of 
statutes. However, a seemingly neutral and technical jurisdic-
tional rule 39  seriously limits the opportunities of the higher 
courts to review most private law cases. Moreover, even when 
the SPC can unify statutory interpretations through its own ju-
dicial interpretation, it often refrains from doing so, especially 
when there are competing interpretations. The following Parts 
elaborate on these points. 
A. POLITICAL COURT PRESIDENTS ATTEND TO LOCAL NEEDS 
Provincial judges have incentives to interpret statutes un-
conventionally because they are less legalistic and more prag-
matic and bureaucratic than judges in other countries. Addition-
ally, China’s institutional environments and diverse local 
conditions foster differences across provincial courts. One of the 
most shocking features of the Chinese judicial system is that 
court presidents40 often do not have any experience on the bench, 
or an undergraduate or graduate-level legal education.41 Court 
presidents are often former party cadres or administrative 
agency heads.42 They are appointed for the job not because they 
are respected jurists, but because they are seasoned politicians 
 
 38. But see Liu Zhong (刘忠), Sifa Difang Baohu Zhuyi Huayu Piping (司法
地方保护主义话语批评) [A Critique of the Discourse on Local Protectionism in the 
Judiciary], 132 FAZHI YU SHEHUI FAZHAN (法制与社会发展) [L. & SOC’Y DEV.] 
22, 38 (2016) (explaining that pressure on courts of first instance comes not from 
local governments, but via courts of second instance from the parties). 
 39. See Notice of Jurisdiction Standards Adjustment, supra note 34. 
 40. The U.S. equivalents of court presidents are chief judges in federal 
courts. Court presidents in China, however, have arguably much greater ad-
ministrative power than their American counterparts. See infra this Part. 
 41. See ZHU SULI (朱苏力), SONGFA XIAXIANG: ZHONGGUO JICENG SIFA 
ZHIDU YANJIU (送法下乡：中国基层司法制度研究 ) [SENDING LAW TO THE 
COUNTRYSIDE: RESEARCH ON CHINA’S BASIC-LEVEL JUDICIAL SYSTEM] 82 
(Revised ed. 2011) (explaining the limits on Chinese judges’ reasoning and ob-
servational abilities); Zuo Weimin (左卫民), Zhongguo Fayuan Yuanzhang Juese 
de Shizheng Yanjiu (中国法院院长角色的实证研究) [The Empirical Study of the 
Roles of the Courts’ Presidents in China], 132 ZHONGGUO FAXUE (中国法学) 
[CHINA L. SCI.] 5, 10–12 (2014). 
 42. See supra note 27. 
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who are expected to follow the lead of the CCP.43 The judiciary, 
under China’s political-legal tradition (政法传统), is considered 
part of the executive branch. 44  Court presidents, often being 
nonjurists, are not hesitant to adopt legal interpretations that 
cater to local needs or reduce adverse sociopolitical conse-
quences.45 
In developed Western countries, chief judges, unlike Chi-
nese court presidents, cannot sway outcomes of individual cases 
handled by other judges. The PRC Constitution does not guar-
antee judges’ independence, however; article 126 merely stipu-
lates court independence (法院独立 ). 46  A court theoretically 
should be independent from other influences, but judges cannot 
(and often lack incentives to) disobey the orders of court presi-
dents.47 As a result, court presidents can informally dictate the 
outcomes of individual cases. Moreover, adjudication commit-
tees (审判委员会 ) within each court provide a formal regime 
 
 43. See Zuo, supra note 41, at 7–8 (according to surveys to judges, attor-
neys, and citizens in one unspecified province, court presidents are recognized 
and expected to be first an administrator, second a politician, and third a law-
yer). 
 44. See Zheng Zhihang (郑智航), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Ruhe Zhixing Gon-
gong Zhengce (最高人民法院如何执行公共政策) [How Does the SPC Enforce Pub-
lic Policy?], 3 FALYU KEXUE (XIBEI ZHENGFA DAXUE XUEBAO) (法律科学(西北政
法大学学报) [SCI. L.J. NORTHWEST U. POL. SCI. & L.] 11, 18 (2014). 
 45. Even federal judges in the United States have been found to have 
twisted procedural rules to attract cases in order to help the local economy. See 
Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 272–75 
(2016). 
 46. Article 126 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China stipu-
lates that “[t]he people’s courts exercise judicial power independently, in accord-
ance with the provisions of law, and not subject to interference by any adminis-
trative organ, public organization or individual.” (人民法院依照法律独立行使审
判权，不受行政机关，社会团体和个人干涉。) XIANFA, art. 126 (2004) (China). 
For the official English translation, see Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
China, NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONGRESS CHINA (Mar. 14, 2004), http://www.npc.gov 
.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372991.htm.Mainstream con-
stitutional scholarship in Taiwan takes the position that the people’s courts, 
rather than individual judges, are independent. See, e.g., Chen Weidong (陈卫
东), Sifa Jiguan Yifa Duli Xingshi Zhiquan Yanjiu (司法机关依法独立行使职权
研究) [On the Independence of the Judiciary], 2014 ZHONGG FAXUE (中国法学) 
[CHINA L. SCI.] 20, 20–21 (2014). 
 47. Jiahui Ai has asked, à la Judge Posner, what Chinese judges maximize. 
Her first and foremost answer is: impressing the administrative leaders of the 
court in order to get promotions and other perks. See Ai Jiahui (艾佳慧 ), 
Zhongguo Faguan Zuidahua Shenmo (中国法官最大化什么) [What Do Chinese 
Judges Maximize?], 3 FALYU YU SHEHUI KEXUE (法律与社会科学) [L. & SOC. 
SCI.] 98, 121–24 (2008). 
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through which court presidents can systematically channel po-
litical influence into a case. An adjudication committee is chaired 
by the court president, and its members include several senior 
judges who have various administrative duties (and accompany-
ing titles and ranks).48 Its main function is to brainstorm on dif-
ficult cases and to advise judges responsible for those cases on 
how to reach sensible decisions.49 Empirical studies on adjudica-
tion committees show that one primary motive of the committees 
is to ameliorate political and social pressure from higher courts, 
provincial, city, and county governments, and the press.50 More-
over, “in many cases the [adjudication] committee went out of its 
way to cater to the government and the Party.”51 If politically or 
socially influential persons prefer a certain outcome of a case, 
courts are likely to issue holdings in support of those prefer-
ences.52 Should the source of external influence enact a formal 
policy in the form of “red letterhead” documents promulgated by 
 
 48. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Yinfa Guanyu Gaige he WanShan 
Renmin Fayuan Shenpan Weiyuanhui Zhidu de Shishi Yijian de Tongzhi (最高
人民法院关于印发《关于改革和完善人民法院审判委员会制度的实施意见》的通知) 
[Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing the Implementation Opinions 
on Reforming and Improving the Judicial Committee System of the People’s 
Court] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 1, 2010, effective Jan. 1, 
2010), arts. 6, 16, http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid= 
127979 (China).  
 49. See Zuo Weimin (左卫民), Shenpan Weiyuanhui Yunxing Zhuangkuang 
de Shizheng Yanjiu (审判委员会运行状况的实证研究) [The Empirical Study of 
the Operation of the Judicial Committee], 3 FAXUE YANJIU (法学研究) [CHINESE 
J.L.] 160, 167 (2016). 
 50. See Wang Lungang (王伦刚 ) & Liu Sida (刘思达 ), Jiceng Fayuan 
Shenpan Weiyuanhui Yali Anjian Juece de Shizheng Yanjiu (基层法院审判委员
会压力案件决策的实证研究) [An Empirical Study on How the Adjudication Com-
mittee in Basic-Level Courts Makes Decisions on Cases with External Pressure] 
1 FAXUE YANJIU (法学研究) [CHINESE J.L.] 80, 82 (2017). But see Zhu, supra 
note 41, at 44–106 (offering a famous defense of the normative desirability of 
adjudication committees based on interviews); Zuo, supra note 26, at 159, 160–
64 (using data from one unspecified province to argue that most adjudication 
committee members have more than ten years of experience on the bench, and 
adjudication committees deal with one to five percent of the total cases). 
 51. Xin He, Black Hole of Responsibility: The Adjudication Committee’s 
Role in a Chinese Court, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 681, 702 (2012) (coming to this 
conclusion based on analysis of archival minutes of an adjudication committee 
in a lower-level court in Shaanxi Province for 2009). 
 52. See Frank K. Upham, Who Will Find the Defendant if He Stays with His 
Sheep? Justice in Rural China, 114 YALE L.J. 1675, 1711 (2005) (book review) 
(observing that “basic court judges act as specialized components of local bu-
reaucracies dedicated to defusing social conflict by the effective resolution of 
local disputes. Instead of being insulated from society, they bargain with it”). 
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government agencies,53 courts may even systematically deviate 
from the ordinary statutory interpretation of a given statute. 
Beyond that, Chinese jurists are far less dogmatic than, for 
example, German jurists, and are arguably more liberal in stat-
utory interpretations than their American colleagues to begin 
with. More specifically, several decades of a near legal vacuum 
since 1949 have made Chinese jurists less legalistic. The Amer-
ican style of jurisprudence, with its emphasis on pragmatic 
thinking and an interdisciplinary approach, has thrived in an 
era with lots of thorny legal issues but no statutes to solve them. 
Judges and legal scholars have subscribed to the Deng Xiaoping 
Theory (邓小平理论): “It does not matter whether it is a yellow 
cat or a black cat, as long as it catches mice.”54 This type of prag-
matic thinking does not ebb as the German-style doctrinal study 
of law gains ground in legal academia in China.55 If Chinese 
judges were as doctrinal and legalistic as their German counter-
parts, they would seek to find the correct interpretation of a 
given statute,56 but in our observation, very few Chinese judges 
think this way. 
 
 53. In China, the CCP’s policies are treated as laws. See Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Minfa Tongze (中华人民共和国民法通则) [General Principles of the 
Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Apr. 27, 1986), art. 6, 
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Gid=2780 (China) [hereinafter Gen-
eral Principals] (“Civil activities must be in compliance with the law; where 
there are no relevant provisions in the law, they shall be in compliance with 
State policies.”). The CCP’s policies have always been viewed as an important 
part of state policies. 
 54. Deng Xiaoping, Restore Agricultural Production (July 7, 1962), in DENG 
XIAOPING, SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING (1938–1965) 292, 293 (The Bu-
reau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and 
Stalin Under the Cent. Comm. of the Communist Party of China trans., Foreign 
Languages Press Beijing 1992) (1989); see also Wang Lungang (王伦刚) & Liu 
Sida (刘思达), Cong Shiti Wenze dao Chengxu Zhi: Zhongguo Fayuan Cuoan 
Zuijiuzhi Yunxing de Shizheng Kaocha (从实体问责到程序之治——中国法院错案
追究制运行的实证考察) [From Substantive Responsibility to the Rule of Proce-
dure: An Empirical Study of the Operation of the Wrongful Case Responsibility 
System in China], 2 FAXUE JIA (法学家) [JURIST] 27, 27–40 (2016). 
 55. For instance, several journals and scholars have started to champion 
the necessity of Kommentar (commentary on every article of a code). See Zhang 
Shuanggen (张双根), Zhu Mang (朱芒), Zhu Qingyu (朱庆育), & Huang Hui (黄
卉), Zhongguo Falyu Pingzhu de Xiangzhuang yu Weilai (中国法律评注的现状与
未来) [The Present and Future of Kommentar in China], 2 ZHONGGUO YINGYONG 
FAXUE (中国应用法学) [CHINA REV. ADMIN. JUST.] 161–73 (2017). 
 56. See generally Basil Markesinis, Judicial Style and Judicial Reasoning 
in England and Germany, 59 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 294, 296–304 (2000) (explaining 
the differences between the style and reasoning of German and English ap-
proaches to judicial thought). 
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Above all, judges in China appear to prioritize solving prob-
lems and maintaining social order (harmony) over simply follow-
ing legal logic. Under the idiosyncratic lifetime wrongful case re-
sponsibility system57 (终身负责制/错案追究制), courts, or the 
ombudsmen department within courts, may punish judges crim-
inally or administratively, respectively, if they render incorrect 
decisions.58 Therefore, for Chinese judges personally, as long as 
both parties are satisfied and no one appeals to a higher court or 
petitions to an administrative agency (a process called xinfang, 
or 信访),59 the decision is good.60 YING Yong, the former Presi-
dent of the Shanghai High Court and the current mayor of 
Shanghai, has publicly declared that, for courts, “to get it done 
is stability; to close a case is ability; and to have no trouble is 
capability” (搞定就是稳定，摆平就是水平，没事就是本事).61 Cor-
rect statutory interpretation takes the back seat. In short, the 
guiding principle in the Chinese judiciary is solving problems ra-
ther than establishing rules. 
B. JURISDICTIONAL RULE 
Jurisdictional rules that assign original jurisdiction accord-
ing to the amount at stake keep most private law cases in the 
provincial courts.62 As described above, a case in China is re-
viewed at most by two levels of courts in a system that contains 
four levels.63 Table 1 below summarizes the jurisdictional rules. 
In more economically developed provinces, the amount at stake 
must be higher to skip the lower levels of courts. In Beijing and 
Shanghai, for instance, if the amount at stake is less than fifteen 
million U.S. dollars, a provincial district court will be the court 
of first instance and its supervising provincial intermediate 
court will be the court of second instance if any party appeals.64 
 
 57. For an overview of this regime and empirical studies of its effect, see 
generally Wang & Liu, supra note 54, at 27–40. 
 58. Id. at 27–28. 
 59. For a detailed explanation of xinfang, the unique administrative peti-
tioning system, see Taisu Zhang, The Xinfang Phenomenon: Why the Chinese 
Prefer Administrative Petitioning over Litigation, 3 SOCIO. STUD. 139 (2009). 
 60. A vivid example of how judges and village cadres work together to me-
diate a loan case between a farmer and a credit union is offered in ZHU, supra 
note 41, at 3–23 and redescribed in Upham, supra note 52, at 1679–81. 
 61. See Guangdong Guo, To Get It Done Is Stability; To Close a Case Is Abil-
ity; And To Have No Trouble Is Capability, SOUTHERN WKLY., June 25, 2009, 
http://www.infzm.com/content/30576. 
 62. See infra Table 1. 
 63. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
 64. See supra note 34. 
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In other words, the case will never be heard by a provincial high 
court. For a party in one of the most developed provinces to bring 
a case before the SPC, the amount at stake must exceed seventy-
five million U.S. dollars; in the least developed provinces, that 
threshold is fifteen million U.S. dollars.65 The chances of having 
a case heard by the SPC are low.66 
To bolster our claim that private law cases are rarely heard 
by the SPC, we analyze three data sets provided to us by one of 
the leading legal service providers in China, ClassicLaw Insti-
tute.67 We explain the data sets in more detail in Part II. For 
now, it should be sufficient to say that these data sets contain 
almost all publicly available cases regarding three mortgage law 
issues. We selected mortgage law to demonstrate our point be-
cause, among private law cases, mortgage disputes are more 
likely to have a higher amount at stake. As Figures 1, 2 and 3 
show, the SPC rendered less than 0.2% of the mortgage law cases 
the authors of this Article studied.68 Even if all the cases that 
went to provincial high courts as first instance cases had been 
appealed, the SPC would still have handled only a tiny fraction 
of such cases. The SPC’s no-show policy in private-law matters 
provides critical space for provincial courts to interpret private-
law statutes according to local needs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 65. See id. 
 66. The SPC, which stipulated this jurisdictional rule, has raised the 
threshold when inflation or economic development made it too easy to bring 
cases to higher-level courts. The last time this jurisdictional rule was promul-
gated was 2008; the threshold at that time was about fifty percent of the current 
rule’s threshold. Compare id., with Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Tiaozheng 
Chushen Minshi, Shangshi Anjian Gaoji Renmin Fayuan he Zhongji Renmin 
Fayuan Guanxia Biaozhun Di Tongzhi (最高人民法院关于调整初审民事，商事案
件高级人民法院和中级人民法管辖标准的通知) [Notice of the Supreme People’s 
Court on Adjusting the Standards for the Jurisdiction of the Higher People’s 
Courts and Intermediate People’s Courts over Civil and Commercial Cases of 
the First Instance] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Feb. 3, 2008, effective 
Feb. 3, 2008), no. 10, http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=104187&lib=law 
(China). 
 67. CLASSIC LAW INST., http://www.classiclaw.com (last visited Apr. 26, 
2018). 
 68. To put this in context, in Taiwan, where a private-law dispute with 
more than fifty-thousand USD at stake can be appealed to the Taiwan Supreme 
Court, their highest court rendered 1.6% of all the rendered civil cases in 2015. 
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Table 1: Jurisdictional Rules Regarding Courts of the 
First Instance 
 
 Amount at Stake to Gain Original Jurisdiction 
(U.S. Dollars) 
 Province Names 
Provincial 
High Court 
Provincial Inter-
mediate Court 
Provincial 
District 
Court 
Beijing, Shanghai, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Guangdong  
≥75M 
 
≥15M 
 
<15M 
 
Tianjin, Heibei, Shanxi, 
Neimenggu, Liangning, 
Anhui, Fujian, Shan-
dong, Henan, Hubei, Hu-
nan, Guanxi, Hainan, Si-
chuan, Chongqing 
≥45M 
 
 
 
 
≥4.5M 
 
 
 
 
<4.5M 
 
 
 
 
Jilin, Heilongjiang, 
Jiangxi, Yunnan, 
Shanxi, Xinjiang 
≥30M 
 
≥1.5M 
 
<1.5M 
 
Guizhou, Tibet, Gansu, 
Qinghai, Ningxia 
≥15M 
 
≥0.75M 
 
<0.75M 
 
 
Notes: This rule has applied since 2015 for parties living in the same province. 
If one party does not live in the jurisdictional province, the threshold amount is 
reduced to about thirty to fifty percent of the threshold indicated in Table 1.  
Data Source: See Notice of Jurisdiction Standards Adjustment, supra note 34. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Cases Among Four Levels of 
Courts—First Mortgage Research Study 
 
Notes: “District” stands for provincial district courts. “Intermediate” stands for 
provincial intermediate courts. “High” stands for provincial high courts. “SPC” 
stands for the Supreme People’s Court. The research question itself will be elab-
orated in Part II. 
Data source: CLASSIC LAW INST., http://www.classiclaw.com (last visited Apr. 
26, 2018). 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Cases Among Four Levels of 
Courts—Second Mortgage Research Study 
 
Notes: “District” stands for provincial district courts. “Intermediate” stands for 
provincial intermediate courts. “High” stands for provincial high courts. “SPC” 
stands for the Supreme People’s Court. The research question itself will be elab-
orated in Part II. 
Data source: CLASSIC LAW INST., http://www.classiclaw.com (last visited Apr. 
26, 2018). 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Cases Among Four Levels of 
Courts—Third Mortgage Research Study 
 
Notes: “District” stands for provincial district courts. “Intermediate” stands for 
provincial intermediate courts. “High” stands for provincial high courts. “SPC” 
stands for the Supreme People’s Court. The research question itself will be elab-
orated in Part II. 
Data source: CLASSIC LAW INST., http://www.classiclaw.com (last visited Apr. 
26, 2018). 
C. SPC’S CONSERVATIVE ATTITUDES 
The SPC is not a full-time adjudicator. Rather, it is a part-
time lawmaker that promulgates statutes in the name of judicial 
interpretation and handpicks cases rendered by lower courts as 
guiding cases.69 Judicial interpretations and guiding cases in the 
Chinese judicial system are, in theory, followed by all courts. In 
practice, however, they can hardly rein in the provincial courts. 
First, guiding cases are less effective than they appear to be. 
According to a recent empirical study spanning from 2010 to 
2016, guiding cases chosen by the SPC were rarely cited by all 
 
 69. For an explanation of how guiding cases work, see China Guiding Cases 
Project, STANFORD LAW SCH., http://cgc.law.stanford.edu (last visited Apr. 26, 
2018). 
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levels of courts.70 More specifically, less than thirty percent of all 
the existing sixty-four guiding cases have been cited.71 Courts in 
only five provinces have cited guiding cases more than ten times; 
most citations have come from the two lowest levels of courts, as 
the SPC has never cited guiding cases itself and there have been 
only two citations at the level of the provincial high court.72 Only 
four percent of the guiding cases fill statutory gaps.73 Eighty-two 
percent of the guiding cases are chosen from cases rendered by 
seven provinces, all of which are economically more developed.74 
The most likely explanation for this phenomenon is that, first, 
lower court judges care more about reversals from the next high-
est court than from the SPC,75 and, second, the higher courts 
have not been guarding the sanctity of the guiding cases. As a 
result, this idiosyncratic Chinese regime does not appear to be 
sufficient to unify statutory interpretations. 
Second, while the SPC has promulgated judicial interpreta-
tions about property, contracts, and torts, their purpose is more 
gap-filling than split-solving. Gap-filling is, of course, an im-
portant judicial function, but gap-filling judicial interpretations 
may act as mere stepping stones from which provincial courts 
are likely to diverge. Recall our theory that a national rule in 
China, no matter whether enacted by the National People’s Con-
gress or promulgated by the SPC, will tend to be interpreted dif-
ferently by provincial courts to fit local needs.76 To unify the in-
terpretation, the SPC must occasionally render a split-solving 
decision or promulgate a split-solving stipulation in one of the 
judicial interpretations. As mentioned above, private-law cases 
have rarely made their way to the SPC; thus, the SPC may not 
even be aware of a split, much less able to establish a precedent 
favoring a particular interpretation. 
The conservative mindset of SPC judges also obstructs the 
SPC from being more active in resolving splits. It appears to be 
 
 70. See Xiang Li (向力), Cong Xianjian Canzhao dao Changgui Canzhao：
Jiyu Zhidaoxing Anli Canzhao Qingkuang de Shizheng Fenxi (从鲜见参照到常
规参照——基于指导性案例参照情况的实证分析) [From Rare Reference to Conven-
tional Reference: An Empirical Analysis of the Guiding Case System in China], 
175 FA SHANG YANJIU (法商研究) [STUD. L. & BUS.] 96, 98–100 (2016). 
 71. Id. at 98. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. at 100. 
 74. See id. at 102. 
 75. See id. at 101. 
 76. See supra Introduction. 
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the SPC’s policy that a judicial interpretation should be promul-
gated only when the dust has settled. By contrast, when two or 
more policy stances have their own supporters, the SPC refrains 
from taking a position. Consider the first and so far only judicial 
interpretation regarding the Property Act. The final draft was 
passed “in principle” by the SPC on December 10, 2015.77 The 
forty-one articles in this draft were sent to the China Civil Law 
Society (中国法学会民法学研究会) for comment.78 On February 
22, 2016, the SPC announced the final version, which contained 
only twenty-two articles.79 In the draft, fourteen articles were 
drafted to present two or more views on particular property law 
issues, and eight of them were not included in the final version.80 
This is strong evidence that the SPC, aware of competing statu-
tory interpretations, decided not to take a position on the matter. 
Another good example is the Interpretation of the SPC on 
Several Issues Concerning the Specific Application of Law in the 
Trial of Disputes over Condominium Ownership, enacted in 
2009.81 The definitions of common areas and common facilities 
were proposed in the draft for public comment, but were taken 
out in the final enactment due to controversy over how to delin-
eate coownership in condominiums.82 However, the debate did 
 
 77. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Shiyong Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Wuquanfa Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi (Yi) (最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国
物权法》若干问题的解释(一)(民法学会讨论稿)) [Interpretation I of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of the Property Law 
of the People’s Republic of China (Draft for China Civil Law Society Discussion)], 
XINCHANG ZHANG JIAN LAWYER NETWORK (新昌张建律师网络) (Feb. 23, 2016) 
[hereinafter Property Law Interpretation Draft], http://m.zhangjianls.com/arti-
cle20150606142710/aritcle285.html. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Shiyong Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Wuquanfa Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi (Yi) (最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国
物权法》若干问题的解释(一)) [Interpretation I of the Supreme People’s Court on 
Several Issues Concerning the Application of the Property Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Feb. 22, 2016, effec-
tive Mar. 1, 2016), [hereinafter Interpretation I] http://en.pkulaw.cn/display 
.aspx?id=3baf5eb4ae84ea48bdfb&lib=law (China). 
 80. Compare id., with Property Law Interpretation Draft, supra note 77. 
 81. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Jianzhuwu Qufensuoyouquan 
Jiufen Anjian Jiti Yingyong Falyu Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
审理建筑物区分所有权纠纷案件具体应用法律若干问题的解释) [Interpretation of 
the SPC on Several Issues Concerning the Specific Application of Law in the 
Trial of Disputes over Condominium Ownership] (promulgated by the Sup. Peo-
ple’s Ct., Mar. 23, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 2009), no. 7, http://www.court.gov.cn/ 
fabu-xiangqing-66.html (China). 
 82. Common areas and common facilities are defined by “public use pur-
pose.” See Guanyu Shenli Jianzhuwu Qufensuoyouquan Jiufen Anjian Juti 
Yingyong Falyu Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi (关于审理建筑物区分所有权纠纷案件具
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not surround technical questions. The issue was a hot potato be-
cause China is one of the few countries in which the development 
of condominiums long precedes the legal authorization.83 
By the time the Property Act was enacted and the SPC set 
out to deal with the issue, common facilities, such as parking 
spaces, had been subject to all kinds of quasi-property arrange-
ments.84 A phased-in unitary solution could still be imposed to 
reduce information costs and streamline property relations. The 
SPC, however, has balked at providing a timely solution. 
To put the idiosyncrasy of Chinese courts in context, it is 
helpful to compare them with the American courts. First, in the 
United States, the Supreme Court is political because Justices 
will decide cases based primarily on, or with a large considera-
tion of, their ideology (liberal versus conservative or democratic 
versus republican). 85  In China, describing courts as political 
means that they are organized under the political branch of gov-
ernment, where only the Communist ideology matters.86 Second, 
 
体应用法律若干问题的解释 (征求意见稿)) [Interpretation of the SPC on Several 
Issues Concerning the Specific Application of Law in the Trial of Disputes over 
Condominium Ownership (Soliciting Opinions Draft)] (promulgated by the Sup. 
People’s Ct., June 16, 2008), art. 2, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/ 
7385694.html (China). However, there has been no consensus on how to define 
public use between property owners and property developers in practice. See 
Tang Hongbo (唐宏波), Zuìgao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli fangwu Suoy-
ouquan Fenge Zhengyì Falyu Shiyong Ruogan Wentí de Jieshì (Zhengqiu Yijian 
Gao)—Yi Feizhi (最高人民法院关于审理建筑物区分所有权纠纷案件具体应用法律
若干问题的解释(征求意见稿)——已废止) [Interpretation of the Supreme People’s 
Court on Several Issues Concerning the Specific Application of Law in the Trial 
of Disputes over the Differentiation of Ownership of Buildings (Draft for Com-
ment)—Terminated], TANG HONGBO LAWYER NETWORK (唐洪波律师网络) (May 
20, 2016), http://www.maxlaw.cn/p-thbls-com/artview/850268690383. 
 83. Before 2007, legal issues regarding condominiums were regulated by 
the Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengshi YiChan Pilin Fangwu Guanli 
Guiding (中华人民共和国城市异产毗连房屋管理规定) [Regulations of People’s Re-
public of China Municipality on the Administration of Adjacent Houses with 
Different Property] (promulgated by the Ministry of Construction, Aug. 15, 
2001, effective Aug. 15, 2001) (China). These regulations offer very few rules 
and those that are provided are unclear and have little power in the hierarchy 
of the PRC’s legal system. Hence, such regulations can hardly be used as legal 
basis in courts. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What Is Legal Doc-
trine?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 517, 520 (2006) (“Many legal researchers now recog-
nize that judicial ideology influences judicial decisions.”). The famous Bush v. 
Gore case is one example. See Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary 
Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1408 (2001). 
 86. For instance, when former Chinese President Hu chose “building a har-
monious socialist society” as the slogan of his era, the SPC echoed by requesting 
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in the United States, the Supreme Court is often political in its 
decisions, whereas lower courts are often nonpolitical. 87  In 
China, every court is political. Third, in the United States, courts 
only provide legal or equitable relief. In China, courts, through 
the political connection of court presidents, may manage to pro-
vide extra-legal relief. For example, courts may pacify a disgrun-
tled defendant by giving his son a job.88 Additionally, they may 
solve the judgement-proof problem by ensuring that the tortfea-
sor receives a loan in order to be able to afford to pay compensa-
tion, while the tort victim receives a job so that he does not de-
mand more compensation.89 
When strong and continuous external political influences 
are present, sometimes in the form of a formal administrative 
policy, Chinese courts are expected to deviate from the standard 
statutory interpretation of a particular provision. The observa-
ble phenomenon can be aptly labeled: decentralized development 
of law. Sometimes, the political and social pressures are ad hoc. 
Chinese courts will adopt extraordinary interpretive approaches 
or use extra-legal measures to resolve those disputes, which of-
ten leads to anomalous interpretations. These two types of ap-
proaches have the same origin—the political and bureaucratic 
nature of Chinese courts. 
II.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE   
The Introduction introduced the institutional environment 
of the Chinese judiciary and pointed out that the political and 
bureaucratic judicial system is under a strict jurisdictional rule 
to bring cases to the highest court to provide fertile ground for 
decentralized or anomalous interpretation of national statutes. 
Part I argued that Chinese courts interpret statutes differently 
when they face political or social pressure. Case studies have 
shown that anomalous statutory interpretations do exist, but 
large-scale empirical studies of judicial decisions in China are 
scant. This Part presents one of the very first such empirical 
 
lower courts to enhance settlement rates, as settlement is considered more har-
monious. See Yedan Li et al., Understanding China’s Court Mediation Surge: 
Insights from a Local Court, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 58 (2018) (discussing the 
rapid rise of mediation rates “spurred by national level policies from the SPC,” 
and “national political ideology”); Jian Wang, Neutral, Biased, or Both? 
Discursive Construction of a Mediator ’s Dual Role, 31 NEGOT. J. 47, 52 (2015). 
 87. See EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 50–51. 
 88. ZHU, supra note 41, at 84 n.52. 
 89. Id. at 85–86. 
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studies to support the anomalous statutory interpretations the-
ory. Section II.A summarizes literature that has found decen-
tralized interpretation in the law of contracts, labor contracts, 
and torts. The rest of Section II.A focuses on property issues. 
Section II.B investigates whether Chinese courts recognized the 
traditional dian (典 ) as a type of property right. Section II.C 
looks into whether Chinese courts have correctly cited the Prop-
erty Act of 2007 (物权法), or have incorrectly cited the Security 
Act of 1995 (担保法) and its accompanying Judicial Interpreta-
tion (担保法司法解释). We find evidence that Chinese courts 
sometimes have gone out of their way to reach unconvincing doc-
trinal results. Note that the purpose of our empirical study is to 
identify the phenomenon of decentralized and anomalous statu-
tory interpretation. The nature of our quantitative work does not 
enable us to tease out the political or social pressure behind the 
scenes. 
Our empirical approach is risky, but this is for a reason. 
Judges under constant political pressure to deviate from stand-
ard statutory interpretations to achieve extra-legal goals are 
more likely to succumb to that political pressure when there are 
multiple reasonable statutory interpretations of a certain issue. 
The two case studies we conducted, however, have only one cor-
rect answer. Rational judges would avoid deviating from the cor-
rect answer. Therefore, if clearly wrong interpretations were 
adopted in a sufficient number of cases, nonstandard (decentral-
ized or anomalous) statutory interpretations should be more 
prevalent when the statutory text is ambiguous. Accordingly, we 
decided to gather empirical evidence in this risky way, as it is 
otherwise impossible to conduct large-scale empirical studies. 
Indeed, even if we could read all the relevant cases, we would 
have a difficult time sorting out cases in which judges adopted 
an unconventional interpretation due to sociopolitical pressure, 
since nonstandard interpretations in these contexts may still be 
reasonable. 
A. EXISTING LITERATURE ON DECENTRALIZED INTERPRETATION 
One recent empirical study shows exactly what our theory 
predicts; the observed phenomenon is a prime example of decen-
tralized interpretations of private law in China. The study fo-
cuses on a judicial interpretation promulgated in 1991, in which 
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the SPC capped the interest rate in loans between natural per-
sons at 400% of the interest rate charged by a bank.90 For legal-
istic judges, the rule is simple and clear—never allowing interest 
rates that exceed the cap. An empirical study collected 1421 
court decisions in Zhejiang Province and found that in nine per-
cent of the sampled cases, the interest rates are higher than the 
cap; this study also found that there are regional variations.91 In 
one of the cities, Wenzhou, the city government established a fi-
nancial task force that stipulates an index of interest rates.92 
The intermediate court in the city was greatly influenced by the 
index and much less frequently allowed above-the-cap interest 
rates.93 In sum, a crystal clear rule has been ignored in a number 
of cases, but administrative policies may often constrain court 
decisions. 
Further, provincial courts have issued guiding opinions (司
法指导意见) that fly in the face of statutes and SPC judicial in-
terpretations. Guiding opinions of provincial courts bind their 
subordinate courts.94 These guiding opinions, while interpreting 
the same statutory provision, are often drastically different from 
one another. The most famous examples are those issued by high 
 
 90. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Shenli Jiedai An-
jian de Ruogan Yijian (最高人民法院关于人民法院审理借贷案件的若干意见) [Sev-
eral Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of Law in the 
Trial of Private Lending Cases] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Aug. 13, 
1991, effective Aug. 13, 1991) (China). 
 91. See Cheng Jinhua (程金华 ), Sibei Lilyu Guize de Sifa Shijian yu 
Chonggou (四倍利率规则的司法实践与重构) [An Empirical Study of Judicial 
Practice of the “Four-Time Interest Rate Rule” in China and Its Implication for 
Reform], 27 ZHONGWAI FAXUE (中外法学) [PEKING U. L.J.] 684, 703 (2015). 
 92. Id. at 706–11. 
 93. Id. 
 94. According to the Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yinfa Guanyu Guifan Shang-
xiaji Renmin Fayuan (最高人民法院印发《关于规范上下级人民法院审判业务关系
的若干意见》的通知) [Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing Several 
Opinions on Regulating the Trial Working Relations Between the People’s 
Courts at Different Levels], higher people’s courts shall guide the trial work of 
local people’s courts at all levels and special people’s courts within their respec-
tive jurisdictions by reviewing cases, formulating trial work documents, releas-
ing directive cases, holding trial work symposiums, organizing training for 
judges, etc. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yinfa Guanyu Guifan Shangxiaji 
Renmin Fayuan (最高人民法院印发《关于规范上下级人民法院审判业务关系的若
干意见》的通知) [Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing Several Opin-
ions on Regulating the Trial Working Relations Between the People’s Courts at 
Different Levels] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 28, 2010, effective 
Dec. 28, 2010), art. 8, http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-2583.html 
(China). 
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courts in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Shanghai regarding renegotia-
tion of labor employment contracts.95 article 35 of the Labor Con-
tract Act of 2008 protects laborers by requiring that reduction in 
salary and changes in workplace cannot be done without renego-
tiations between employers and employees, and new agreements 
must be put in writing.96 In other words, employers cannot uni-
laterally change the major employment conditions in labor con-
tracts. A judicial interpretation by the SPC reiterates the gist of 
this protective stipulation. 
Nevertheless, the guiding opinions issued by the three afore-
mentioned provincial high courts manipulate the meaning of the 
statutory text by essentially allowing employers to act unilater-
ally.97 While blatantly violating the plain meaning of both a stat-
ute and a judicial interpretation, these guiding opinions have not 
been challenged or corrected by the National People’s Congress 
 
 95. See Zhou Changzheng (周长征 ), Guoji Jinrong Weiji Beijing Xia 
Laodong Hetong Fa de Shishi: Jian lun Sifa Nengdong Zhuyi zai Laodong 
Zhengyi Chuli Zhong de Zuoyong yu Juxian (国际金融危机背景下劳动合同法的
实施——兼论司法能动主义在劳动争议处理中的作用与局限) [The Implementation 
of the Labor Contract Act During International Financial Crisis: With Com-
ments on the Effects and Limits of Judicial Activism in Employment Disputes], 
5 QINGHUA FAXUE (清华法学) [TSINGHUA L.J.] 15, 17–18 (2010). 
 96. See, Labor Law, art. 35. 
 97. For a different interpretation of article 35 of the Labor Contract Act, 
see Jiangsu Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan， Jiansu Sheng Laodong Zhengyi 
Zhongcai Weiyuanhui Guanyu Shenli Laodong Zhengyi Anjian de Zhidao Yijian 
(江苏省高级人民法院、江苏省劳动争议仲裁委员会《关于审理劳动争议案件的指导
意见》) [Guiding Opinions Regarding Labor Dispute Cases Issued by Jiangsu 
Provincial High Court and Jiangsu Labor Dispute Arbitration Committee] 
(promulgated by the Jiangsu Provincial High Court and Jiangsu Labor Dispute 
Arbitration Committee Dec. 14, 2009, effective Dec. 14, 2009), art. 14 (China) 
(stipulating that when employers are in business hardship, they can unilater-
ally take actions to amend labor contracts and no written document is required); 
Sanghai Gaoyuan Guanyu Shiyong Laodong Hetong Fa Ruogan Wenti de Yijian 
(上海高院《关于适用<劳动合同法>若干问题的意见》) [Opinions Regarding Inter-
preting Labor Contract Act Issued by Shanghai Provincial High Court] (prom-
ulgated by Shanghai Provincial High Court Mar. 3, 2009, effective Mar. 3, 2009), 
art. 3 (China) (stipulating that written documents used to change employment 
agreements include salary notification and change of post and rank notification, 
which essentially gives employers the power to unilaterally change salary, post, 
and rank of the employees); Zhejiang Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Guanyu 
Shenli Laodong Zhengyi Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Yijian (Shixing) (浙江省高级
人民法院《关于审理劳动争议案件若干问题的意见（试行）》) [Opinions Regard-
ing Labor Dispute Cases Issued by Zhejiang Provincial High Court] (promul-
gated by Zhejiang Provincial High Court Apr. 16, 2009, effective Apr. 16, 2009), 
art. 42 (China) (stipulating that if major rights or duties are not changed—or, 
if changed, but the changes are necessary for the employers’ operation—and 
given that laborers’ compensation and other labor conditions are not changed 
adversely, employers have the power to unilaterally change the labor contract).  
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nor the SPC. These high courts have given employers extreme 
flexibility despite the fact that they are not the ideologically fa-
vored group in communist China. This is likely due to the sur-
prising 2008 financial crisis. Firms in each of the three provinces 
are economic engines of China’s growth.98 Thus, to attain a soft 
landing, courts were likely willing to bend the statutory text to 
give employers leeway in dealing with the global recession. 
There are more contrasting views of the Labor Contract Act. 
The plain meaning of the Labor Contract Act prescribes that af-
ter two consecutive fixed-term labor contracts have been signed, 
employees can request that employers sign indefinite-term em-
ployment contracts.99 The Beijing High Court has reaffirmed 
this textual interpretation.100 The Shanghai High Court, by con-
trast, in the Opinion of Several Questions concerning the Appli-
cation of the Labor Contract Law (关于适用《劳动合同法》若干
问题的意见),101 maintained that an employer’s consent to indefi-
nite terms is required and must be voluntary.102 Moreover, the 
Labor Contract Act stipulates that dispatched laborers can be 
used in only “temporary, auxiliary or alternative positions” (临时
性、辅助性或者替代性崗位).103 Disputes arise as to whether a 
dispatched labor contract is valid when the worker is slotted in 
a long-term and important position. Most provincial courts, such 
as those in Guangdong, Liaoning, Jilin, and Chongqing, probably 
 
 98. Provincial GDP growths in Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu in 2008 
were 11.5%, 11.8%, and 13.7%, whereas those in 2009 reduced to 3.1%, 3.4%, 
and 10.2%. See Indices of Gross Regional Product, Quarterly by Province, NAT’L 
BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery 
.htm?cn=E0102 (last visited Apr. 26, 2018). 
 99. See Labor Law, art. 14. 
 100. See Beijing Shi Gaoji Renmin Fayuan, Beijing Shi Laodong Zhengyi 
Zhongcai Weiyuanhui Guanyu Laodong Zhengyi Anjian Falyu Shiyong Wenti 
Yantaohui Huiyi Jiyao (北京市高级人民法院、北京市劳动争议仲裁委员会关于劳
动争议案件法律适用问题研讨会会议纪要) [The Beijing Higher People’s Court and 
the Beijing Labor Dispute Arbitration Commission Jointly Release the Minutes 
of the Seminar on the Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Cases 
Involving Labor Disputes] (promulgated by the Beijing Higher People’s Court 
and the Beijing Labor Dispute Arbitration Commission May 7, 2014, effective 
May 7, 2014), art. 34 (China). 
 101. See Shanghai Shi Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Yinfa Guanyu 
Shiyong Laodong Hetong Fa Ruogan Wenti de Yijian de Tongzhi (上海市高级人
民法院关于印发《关于适用<劳动合同法>若干问题的意见》的通知) [Shanghai 
High Court on the Issuance of Opinions Regarding Several Issues Concerning 
the Application of the Labor Contract Law] (promulgated by Shanghai High 
Court Mar. 3, 2009, effective Mar. 3, 2009) (China). 
 102. Id. at art. 4. 
 103. See Labor Law, art. 66. 
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followed national and provincial statutes and regarded such con-
tracts as invalid—in effect holding instead there is an indefinite-
term employment contract implied in the relationship between 
the actual employer and the dispatched laborer. 104  In other 
words, there is a de facto employment contract. By contrast, the 
Shanghai High Court publicized meeting minutes regarding the 
Application of Law in Labor Dispatch Issues (关于劳务派遣适用
法律若干问题的会议纪要) in 2015 by way of informal regula-
tion.105 The meeting minutes took the position that the labor dis-
patch contract is still valid; employers, however, could be subject 
to administrative fines for these contracts.106 Once again, courts 
in Shanghai took the proemployer stance. 
In tort law, provincial courts also go their own ways. In its 
law-making mode, in 2001 the SPC announced a Judicial Inter-
pretation regarding Pain and Suffering Damages (最高人民法院
关于确定民事侵权精神损害赔偿责任若干问题的解释).107 In article 
10, the local living standard is listed as one of the factors to be 
 
 104. See Chongqing Shi Zhigong Quanyi Baozhang Tiaoli (重庆市职工权益保
障条例) [Regulation of Chongqing City on Regulation of Protection on Rights 
and Interests of Employees] (promulgated by Chongqing Municipal People’s 
Congress Dec. 6, 2002, effective May 1, 2003) (China); Jilin Sheng Laowu Pai-
qian Guanli Banfa (吉林省劳务派遣管理办法) [Administrative Rules of Jilin 
Province on Labor Dispatches] (promulgated by Jilin Provincial Department of 
Human Resources and Social Security Dec. 1, 2011, effective Dec. 1, 2011) 
(China); Liaoing Zhigong Quanyi Baozhang Tiaoli (辽宁职工权益保障条例) [Reg-
ulation of Liaoning Province on Protection of Rights and Interests of Employees] 
(promulgated by Liaoning Provincial People’s Congress May 30, 2013, effective 
Aug. 1, 2013) (China); Shandong Jingji Tequ Zhigong Quanyi Baozhang Tiaoli  
(汕头经济特区职工权益保障条例) [Regulation of Shantou Special Economic Zone 
on Protection of Rights and Interests of Employees] (promulgated by Shantou 
City People’s Congress Aug. 27, 2015, effective Oct. 1, 2015) (China).  
 105. See Shanghai Shi Renliziyuan he Shehui Baozhang Ju, Shangshi Shi 
Gaoyuan Guanyu Laowu Paiqian Shiyong Falyu Ruogan Wenti de Huiyi Jiyao 
(上海市人力资源和社会保障局、上海市高院关于劳务派遣适用法律若干问题的会议
纪要) [The Meeting Minutes of Shanghai Municipal Human Resources and So-
cial Insurance Bureau & Shanghai High Court Regarding Application of Law in 
Labor Dispatch Issues] (promulgated by Shanghai Municipal Human Resources 
and Social Insurance Bureau and Shanghai High Court Dec. 31, 2014, effective 
Dec. 31, 2014) (China). 
 106. Id. at art. 4. 
 107. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Queding Minshi Qinquan Jingshen 
Sunhai Peichang Zeren Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于确定民事侵权
精神损害赔偿责任若干问题的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court 
on Problems Regarding the Ascertainment of Compensation Liability for Emo-
tional Damages in Civil Torts] (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court 
Feb. 26, 2001, effective Mar. 10, 2001) (China). 
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considered in assessing the amount of pain and suffering dam-
ages.108 In an essay written by an SPC judge, published along 
with the judicial interpretation, the local living standard is high-
lighted and the essay essentially encourages provincial courts to 
refrain from imitating one another in setting guidelines for as-
sessing pain and suffering damages.109 With this green light, 
provincial high courts and intermediate courts stipulated differ-
ent caps and formulas for pain and suffering damages, essen-
tially pricing lives and limbs differently under a unitary sys-
tem.110 
While this example may not be a strong case for our theory, 
it demonstrates that even the SPC has encouraged decentralized 
development of tort law.111 
 
 108. Id. at art. 10. 
 109. See Chen Xianjie (陈现杰), Guyuan Queding Guanyu Queding Minshi 
Qinquan Jingshen Sunhai Peichang Zeren Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi de Lijie Yu 
Shiyong (<关于确定民事侵权精神损害赔偿责任若干问题的解释>的理解与适用) 
[Understanding and Application of Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court 
on Problems Regarding the Ascertainment of Compensation Liability for 
Emotional Damages in Civil Torts], 4 RENMIN SIFA (人民司法 ) [PEOPLE’S 
JUDICATURE] 14 (2001). 
 110. Compare the court practices in the following three provincial courts:  
First, in Anhui Province, pain and suffering damages shall be between 
50,000 and 80,000 RMB. See Anhui Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Shenli Rens-
hen Sunhai Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Zhidao Yijian (安徽省高级人民法院审理人
身损害案件若干问题的指导意见) [Guiding Opinion Issued by the Higher People’s 
Court of Anhui Province Regarding Personal Injury Cases] (promulgated by the 
Judicial Committee of the Higher People’s Court of Anhui Province, Dec. 26, 
2005, effective Feb. 22, 2006; amended July 2006), art. 25 (China).  
Second, in Guangdong Province, pain and suffering damages for grave in-
juries or death shall be below 300,000 RMB. See Guangdong Sheng Gaoyuan 
Guanyu Zai Guojia Peichang Gongzuo Zhong Shiyong Jingshen Sunhai Fuwei-
jin Ruogan Wenti de Zuotanhui Jiyao (广东省高院关于在国家赔偿工作中适用精
神损害抚慰金若干问题的座谈会纪要) [Seminar Summary of the Higher People’s 
Court of Guangdong Province Regarding Awarding Pain and Suffering Dam-
ages in State Compensation Disputes] (promulgated by Guangdong Higher Peo-
ple’s Court Sept. 5, 2011, effective Sept. 5, 2011), art. 9 (China).  
Third, in Sichuan Province, pain and suffering damages in wrongful death 
cases shall be calculated according to the average living expenses at the court 
venue for twenty years. See Sichuan Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Guanche 
Zhixing Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Queding Minshi Qinquan Jingshen 
Sunhai Peichang Zeren Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi de Yijian (四川省高级人民法院
贯彻执行最高人民法院<关于确定民事侵权精神损害赔偿责任若干问题的解释>的意
见) [Opinions Issued by the Higher People’s Court of Sichuan Province Regard-
ing Implementing the Guiding Opinions Issued by the Supreme People’s Court 
Regarding Pain and Suffering Damages in Civil Torts Cases] (promulgated by 
the Sichuan Higher People’s Court May 23, 2002, effective July 1, 2002), art. 3 
(China). 
 111. For other examples of decentralized development of tort law, see, for 
example, Tian Fang (田芳), Falyu Jieshi Ruhe Tongyi: Guanyu Sifa Jieshi Quan 
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B. THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE DIAN RIGHT 
Having summarized the empirical literature so far, we set 
out to lay out our own empirical results. In this section, we in-
vestigate the unique dian right.112 Dian has been used for about 
a thousand years in China, and yet it has lost favor with law-
makers. Article 5 of China’s Property Act of 2007 and article 116 
of the Book of General Principles of the Chinese Civil Code, 
passed in March 2017, adopt a strict version of the numerus clau-
sus principle, meaning that only statutorily sanctioned property 
forms are allowed.113 Dian rights, however, were not sanctioned 
by any statute and shall not have in rem, third-party effect, pur-
suant to the numerus clausus principle. Yet a rigid stance like 
this may not fit well into every case on the ground. Given that 
the numerus clausus principle was not prescribed between 1949 
and 2007, a lot of transacting parties must be using property 
forms that are not recognized under statute, and courts might be 
unwilling to employ a strict construction of the stipulation. In 
the aforementioned final draft of the judicial interpretation re-
garding the Property Act, its first article addresses exactly this 
question.114 The proposed final draft of the judicial interpreta-
tion maintains the strict construction of the numerus clausus 
principle. 115 The alternative interpretation listed in the final 
draft takes the position that statute in the context of the nu-
merus clausus principle should be interpreted flexibly,116 so that 
 
de Falyu Tongyi Jieshi Gongneng de Sikao (法律解释如何统一——关于司法解释
权的法律统一解释功能的思考) [How To Unify the Legal Interpretation?], 6 FALYU 
KEXUE (法律科学) [SCI. OF L.J. NORTHWEST U. POL. SCI. & L.] 3, 8 (2007) (noting 
that provincial courts are divided on whether local governments can sue negli-
gent drivers who have killed homeless people with no known relatives). 
 112. Dian is like a conditional sale. The property owner may dian her right 
to another, who will possess and use the land for decades. The dian price is 
below the outright sale price. By the pre-established redeeming deadline, if the 
property owner cannot afford to repay the dian price to the long-term possessor, 
the latter will become the new owner. See Taisu Zhang, Cultural Paradigms in 
Property Institutions, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 347 (2016). 
 113. See Property Rights Law, art 5; General Civil Law Provisions, art. 116. 
 114. See Interpretation I. 
 115. See id. at art. 5. 
 116. This interpretation, however, is a blatant deviation from the statutory 
text. Although we use the Latin term numerus clausus to describe the stipula-
tion, the exact wording of article 5 is that “the types and contents of property 
rights shall be prescribed by ‘statutes.’” Statutes (法律), according to the Legis-
lation Act, clearly mean legal rules passed by the National People’s Congress. 
Lifa Fa (立法法) [Law on Legislation] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000) 2000 STANDING 
COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 112. There is no ambiguity in the text. 
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the dian right and the residence right (recognized in France, 
Germany, and elsewhere) may be valid. Neither interpretation 
was adopted, as this article was not included in the final version. 
Nonetheless, because the final draft passed by the SPC explicitly 
uses the dian right as one of the two prime examples to explain 
why loosening the strict numerus clausus principle warrants 
consideration, 117 we set out to analyze how provincial courts 
have treated the dian right and whether there are local varia-
tions. Our conjecture is that provincial courts may have recog-
nized dian rights as property rights; thus, the SPC sensed the 
necessity to formally sanction this position. 
As it now stands, the only reasonable doctrinal explanation 
of article 5 of the Property Act, in light of its legislative history, 
is that dian is not a property right. ClassicLaw contained 
18,025,009 cases as of Feb. 2, 2017. We searched post-2007 cases 
and found thirty-three cases that explicitly used the term dian 
right and dealt with disputes regarding this type of arrange-
ment.118 In nine of these cases, courts explicitly recognized dian 
as a property right.119 These dian rights were established as 
early as 1954 or as late as 2011, and have been recognized by the 
provincial high court in Henan and intermediate or district 
courts in Jiangsu, Shandong, and Fujian.120 Note that in the 
twenty-four cases in which courts did not explicitly recognize the 
property status of dian, we argue that they implicitly did so by 
using the term dian right (典权), because in Chinese usage, the 
word right will only be embedded in the names of property 
rights, not contracts. 
That said, a total of thirty-three cases that deviate from the 
standard statutory interpretation is not strong evidence for de-
centralized or anomalous interpretations of private law. There-
fore, we conducted a second study, reported below, in Section 
II.C. Note, however, that we doubt that only a handful of courts 
have dealt with the dian right. Otherwise, why would the final 
draft of the aforementioned SPC judicial interpretation use dian 
as one prime example?121 Perhaps courts are fully aware of the 
 
 117. See Interpretation I, art. 1. 
 118. The full list of cases is included in appendix on the Minnesota Law Re-
view website. http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/ 
ChangXu_dianRightsSummary.pdf. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See Interpretation I. Also, in 1990, the SPC explicitly recognized dian 
right in its official answer to a question asked by the Henan High Court. Zuigao 
Renmin Fayuah Guanyu Gongsiheying Zhong Dian Quan Rug de Fangwu Ying 
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ill effect of deviating from a clear statute without any local or 
national guiding opinions as authorities; thus, they chose not to 
publicize these opinions. Before 2013, courts had no legal duty 
to publicize all their opinions. After the all-cases-online policy 
announced by the SPC in 2013,122 many believe that some courts 
have not fully complied with the SPC policy. A recent empirical 
study estimates that only fifty percent of the cases in 2014 and 
2015 were publicized.123 Hence, half of the cases may still not be 
public, and those cases are unlikely to be a random sample of all 
the cases. 
C. THE BATTLE OF TWO SECURITY RIGHT STATUTES 
Our exploration of the dian right was inconclusive as to 
whether provincial courts often made decentralized and anoma-
lous statutory interpretations. We thus test our theory in an-
other field: mortgage. Mortgage is the first type of limited prop-
erty right formally recognized by statutes—albeit not 
necessarily conceptualized as a type of property right in the be-
ginning. In the General Principles of the Civil Law Act of 1986   
(民法通则), ownership, coownership, state ownership, and collec-
tive ownership were defined, but no limited property rights were 
included.124 The Security Act of 1995 specified the rules regard-
ing guarantee, mortgage, and pledge.125 The stipulations in this 
 
Ruhe Chuli de Han (最高人民法院关于公私合营中典权入股的房屋应如何处理的 
函) [Letter of the SPC on How To Deal with Equity Ownership in Public-Private 
Partnership] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Apr. 9, 1990, effective Apr. 
9, 1990) (China). Thus, transacting parties for years may have relied on this 
positive answer and use dian to structure their deal. 
 122. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guahyu Renmin Fayuan Zai Hulianwang 
Gongbu Caipan Wenshu de Guiding; Fa Shi (最高人民法院关于人民法院在互联
网公布裁判文书的规定；法释) [Provisions of the SPC on the Issuance of Judg-
ments on the Internet by the People’s Courts] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s 
Ct., Nov. 21, 2013, effective Jan. 1, 2014) (China).  
 123. See Ma Chao, Ma Xiaohong & He Haibo, Big Data Analysis: A Report 
on Publications of Judicial Cases, 4 CHINA L. REV. 195, 242 (2016). 
 124. General Principles, arts. 71, 73, 74, 78. 
 125. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Danbao Fa (中华人民共和国担保法) [The 
Guarantee Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 30, 1995, effective Oct. 1, 1995), art. 2 [here-
inafter Guarantee Law], http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl& 
Gid=9be45428dc2a2777bdfb&keyword=&EncodingName=&Search_Mode= 
like&Search_IsTitle=0 (China). 
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Act do not clarify whether mortgage is a type of property, con-
tract, or something in between.126 Eventually, when the Prop-
erty Act of 2007 included mortgage as a type of security right,127 
it became clear that, conceptually, mortgage is a property right 
in China. 
1. The Statutory Interpretation Issue 
Doctrinal questions, however, arise. Several stipulations in 
the Property Act and the Security Act overlap, and even conflict, 
with each other. While the National People’s Congress did not 
repeal the Security Act, article 178 of the Property Act explicitly 
prescribes that the Property Act should prevail should there be 
a conflict between the Property Act and the Security Act. 128 
Thus, for most jurists around the world, it is a no-brainer to ap-
ply the Property Act should there be a direct conflict. Nonethe-
less, based on prior discussions with other Chinese scholars, we 
had reason to believe that the continued existence of the Security 
Act gives courts leeway to apply it should the context of the case 
require. 
We identify three sets of doctrines where the Property Act 
and the Security Act (or Judicial Interpretation Regarding the 
Security Act) are explicitly in conflict with each other. They are: 
(1) article 204 of the Property Act versus article 61 of the Secu-
rity Act;129 (2) article 202 of the Property Act versus article 12 of 
the Judicial Interpretation regarding the Security Act;130 and (3) 
article 191 of the Property Act versus article 67 of the Security 
Act.131 The first set concerns whether the debt secured by a line-
of-credit mortgage can be consigned;132 the second set regards 
the statute of limitations for foreclosure;133 and the third set dis-
agrees on whether consent of mortgagees is required before sale 
 
 126. Many countries conceptualize mortgage as a kind of contract or as a 
right halfway along the contract-property continuum, although functionally 
mortgage is a type of property. See Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, 
Structure and Style in Comparative Property Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS, 131, 150–55 (Theodore Eisenberg & Giovanni B. Ramello eds., 
2016). 
 127. Property Rights Law, arts. 179–207. 
 128. Id. art. 178.  
 129. Compare id. art. 204, with Guarantee Law, art. 61. 
 130. Compare Property Rights Law, art. 202, with Guarantee Law, art.12. 
 131. Compare Property Rights Law, art. 191, with Guarantee Law, art. 67. 
 132. See sources cited supra note 129. 
 133. See sources cited supra note 130. 
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of movable things subjected to chattel mortgage.134 In the first 
and third sets, the Property Act favors creditors as compared to 
the Security Act, while in the second set the Property Act favors 
debtors. 
2. Data and Methodology 
We acquired our databases from ClassicLaw. 135 Literally 
millions of cases involve mortgage. Any keywords we used in the 
ordinary user interface produced more results than we could di-
gest, and hand-coding the selected cases would have consumed a 
great deal of research resources. We thus sought assistance from 
ClassicLaw. For each of three sets of doctrinal conflicts, we chose 
several keywords that would narrow the search to relevant cases 
(only cases rendered after the Property Act went into force in 
2007 are relevant). This search generated 4399; 876; and 79,841 
potentially relevant cases in questions one, two, and three, re-
spectively. ClassicLaw then used its advanced text-mining algo-
rithms to identify cases that contain the relevant article number 
and statute name of either act in the reasoning part of the opin-
ions. For each potentially relevant case, ClassicLaw also pro-
vided us with information regarding court levels, first or second 
instance, plaintiff and defendant types (banks, companies, or 
others), plaintiff and defendant representation types, verdict 
dates, and other information. 
The databases inform us of whether a case cites the Property 
Act, the Security Act, both, or neither. The cases that only cite 
the specific articles of the Property Act are likely to be correct at 
least in terms of the statutory interpretation questions concern-
ing us here because the National People’s Congress has made it 
clear that the Property Act prevails.136 The numerous cases that 
cite neither are likely irrelevant and excluded from analysis. 
Those that cite both Acts may be wrong if judges eventually re-
ject applying the Property Act, though we suspect that this is 
unlikely.137 The cases that cite only the specific articles of the 
Security Act are our suspects for incorrect statutory interpreta-
tions. Each case was read to exclude false negatives. For in-
stance, if the secured transactions were consummated before 
 
 134. See sources cited supra note 131. 
 135. CLASSIC LAW INST., http://www.classiclaw.com (last visited Apr. 26, 
2018). 
 136. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.  
 137. The numbers of cases that cited both statutes are ten, seven, and sixty 
in questions one, two, and three respectively. 
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2007, the Security Act should apply. These cases are excluded 
from the list of wrongly decided cases. In short, we define cases 
that cited but should not have applied only the Security Act as 
incorrectly decided, and cases that cited only the Property Act as 
correctly decided. 
3. Findings and Discussion 
While we have identified ninety-two cases, or nine percent 
of the relevant mortgage cases,138 in which the Chinese courts 
incorrectly cited only the Security Act,139 there seems to be no 
pattern behind the wrong statutory interpretations. Figure 4 
shows the distributions of correct and incorrect statutory inter-
pretations among the three research questions. Question two 
has a more balanced distribution between the two results, and 
the largest number of incorrect interpretations occurred when 
courts dealt with this question. Among the three sets of statutory 
provisions, the Property Act is only more prodebtor than the Se-
curity Act on this question. One might suppose that potentially 
politically influential creditors like banks or credit unions are 
more likely to sway the courts to apply the more pro-creditor Se-
curity Act when they are one of the parties. Unreported statisti-
cal analysis did not produce evidence that supports this conjec-
ture. We have categorized courts in our data into eastern, 
central, and western according to a popular classification system 
based on levels of economic development.140 We did not find re-
gional patterns in citing the wrong statute. 
Our take-away lesson is that the incorrectly decided cases 
appear to be isolated events, but not systemic (region-wide) de-
viations. They are evidence of widespread anomalous statutory 
interpretations. Without further archival work and on-site inter-
views, it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to identify the political 
calculus behind these cases. We thus cannot declare that our em-
 
 138. We define the relevant mortgage cases as those that cited either or both 
statutes—a total of 1054 cases. Of those, ninety-two were decided incorrectly, 
yielding a nine percent error rate. The erroneous decision rate would be much 
higher but for the high number of correctly decided cases in question three. 
 139. Twenty-three cases were handled by intermediate courts and sixty-nine 
cases were handled by district courts. Forty cases were handled by courts in the 
Eastern region; twenty-nine cases were handled by courts in the Central region; 
and twenty-three cases were handled by courts in the Western region. In fifty-
nine of the ninety-two cases, at least one party was represented by an attorney. 
 140. See Sheng-long Liu & An-gang Hu, Transportation Infrastructure and 
Economic Growth: Perspective from China’s Regional Disparities, 4 CHINA IN-
DUS. ECON. 14, 14 (2010). 
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pirical findings are direct evidence for our positive theory. None-
theless, the findings are consistent with the theory. 
 
Figure 3: Distributions of Correct and Incorrect Statu-
tory Interpretations 
Note. Q1 refers to the first research question, and so on. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have advanced a theory that courts in 
China render nonstandard statutory interpretations of private 
laws. If local governments systemically exert political influence 
over courts via the political court presidents, regional deviation 
from the statutory text is likely to take place. If the external 
pressure is ad hoc, private laws will be interpreted idiosyncrati-
cally from time to time, but not systemically. Several other arti-
cles have found evidence in support of decentralized interpreta-
tions of private laws, though they do not put the case studies 
within our theoretical framework. Our two case studies have 
identified dozens of court cases that violate the clear meaning of 
private-law statutes. While the external force that affects the ju-
dicial decisions is unclear, it is likely to exist behind the scene.  
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Our Article thus lays the groundwork for answering the next 
big question: do decentralized and anomalous statutory interpre-
tations of the same statutory provision help or hurt economic de-
velopment? Our case studies present a mixed picture. Dian is a 
thousand-year-old property form. The information cost of under-
standing the nature and existence of such a right within the com-
munity might be on the low end. It thus makes sense for local 
courts to put the numerus clausus principle aside and recognize 
dian as valid in rem transactions. By contrast, for mortgage ar-
rangements consummated after 2007, given the clear content 
and the reasonableness of the new rule, courts should not at-
tempt to reassign entitlements between creditors and debtors. 
Citing incorrect statutes will confuse the parties and send the 
wrong signals to the local business community. 
